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CASENOTE
DEFINING "SIGNIFICANCE": BALANCING PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEGATIVE DECLARATIONS UNDER THE MINNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agencyl
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Minnesota, by enacting the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), has
declared a statewide policy that requires substantive protections and results from the environmental
review process.3 The scope of Minnesota's environmental policy surpasses the limited scope of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), MEPA's federal counterpart.4 Whereas NEPA is
strictly a procedural statute, demanding deference to agency decision-making, Minnesota courts may
conduct both procedural and substantive review of agency decisions under MEPA.
In Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MCEA), the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a state agency's finding that timber harvesting.,
mitigated by voluntary mitigation strategies, posed no potential for "significant- environmental
impact, and thus, did not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement.' Failing to
provide an adequate legal definition of "significant" environmental effects under Minnesota law.7
the court reviewed MCEA on purely procedural grounds, ignoring the substantive environmental
requirements imposed by the state legislature.8
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the instant decision, the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) filed a
declaratory judgment action against the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in
Minnesota's Ninth Judicial District of Koochiching County. 9 The lawsuit followed a 5-1 decision by
MPCA's board (Board), concluding that the Boise Cascade Corporation's (Boise) proposal to
increase its Fulp wood production did not require an Environmental Impact Statement (impact
statement).1 The impact statement would entail a "more detailed and time-consuming" analysis of
the potential environmental effects of the proposal.'
644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (hereinafter "MCEA").




6 Infra pts. II, IV.
Infra pt. V.
8 Id.
9 World Reporter. Judge Advances Expansion of International Falls, Minn., Paper Mill, Knight-Ridder
Tribune, 2000 WL 29454122 at *1 (Nov. 15, 2000).
'o MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 459.
" Dennis Lien, Minnesota Paper Company Alloued to Raise Production: Decision Questioned, Knight-
Ridder Tribune, 2000 WL 14921105 at *1 (Feb. 23, 2000).
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Boise operates a pulp and paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota, and produces a variety
of fine paper products.12 In order to reduce the mill's dependency upon pulp purchased on the
outside market,' 3 Boise proposed an efficiency improvement project that would expand the mill's
maximum wood consumption by 100,000 cords of wood.14 MCEA and other Minnesota
environmental groups attacked the Boise proposal with concerns that the timber data used by MPCA
to evaluate the environmental effects of the project was inaccurate and would result in the
unsustainable deforestation of Minnesota's timber.'5 Specifically, MCEA criticized the use of a
Forestry Generic Environmental Impact Statement (generic impact statement) in the preparation of
an Environmental Assessment Worksheet (environmental assessment) required under Minnesota
environmental law.16 Nevertheless, the Board, upon the recommendations of MPCA staff and the
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), concluded that "there would be no
significant impact to the state's timber resources,"17 and an impact statement was not required. 1
MCEA challenged the Board's decision in Minnesota district court arguing that MPCA's
refusal to require an impact statement violated Minnesota law.19 MCEA argued that, under the
Sustainable Forest Resource Act (SFRA) 20 MPCA's reliance upon mitigation measures to control
the environmental impact of the Boise proposal was inappropriate.21 The district court granted
summary judgment for defendants MPCA and Boise.22 and held, first, that MPCA ap ropriately used
the generic impact statement within its preparation of the environmental assessment. Second, the
court held that the mitigation measures were appropriate under the SFRA.24 Finally, because
.substantial deference" is given to administrative agencies, the court held that the MCEA could not
show that the MPCA's conclusions were "arbitrary or capricious." 25
MCEA appealed the decision of the district court to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. That
court questioned the sufficiency of the mitigation measures, stating that "many of the measures have
not been performed and there is no regulatory method to assure performance." 26 Furthermore,
[w]ithout some assurances that mitigation measures can be compelled, even [with] good-faith
12 M'ICEA, 644 N.W.2d at 459.
13d. Boise consumed approximately 600,000 cords at the time the action was filed. The proposal would
expand Boise's consumption to approximately 700,000 cords, of which the additional timber was to be
harvested w ithin a 150-mile radius of the mill.
14Id. at n. 2. *A cord of wood is a stack of wood 4 feet wide, 4 feet high, and 8 feet long."
Lien. 2000 WL 14921105 at * 1. The article notes that "the project would increase statewide wood
consumption by only about 2 percent." MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 460 (MDNR estimated a maximum increase of.
2.5 percent in statewide timber harvest levels).
1 Lien, 2000 WL 14921105 at *2; see Infra pt. Ill (providing an explanation of Minnesota's statutory and
regulatory environmental review process); see MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 461; see generally Minn. Stat. §
I I 6D.04 (2000).
Lien, 2000 WL 14921105 at *2 (The Board also denied MCEA's request to submit the issue to an
administrative law judge for a recommendation.).
IS MCEA. 644 N.W.2d at 461.
SId.
'0 "Sustainable Forest Resources Act," Minn. Stat. § 89A.01, .07, .09 (2000).
MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 461.
22 Id. (-[Boise] intervened and was joined as a party defendant."').
23Id.
24 Id. at 461-62.
25Id. at 462.
26 Minn. Ctr. for Envil. Advoc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 632 N.W.2d 230, 234 (Minn. App. 2001).
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intentions.. .the potential for unmitigated and irreparable environmental harm remains."27
Ultimately, because there was not substantial evidence to support the MPCA's conclusion that
"potentially adverse environmental effects of the Boise project [were] subject to mitigation by
ongoing public regulatory authority," 28 the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and
ordered the MPCA to prepare an impact statement. 29
MPCA and Boise appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed, allowing the Boise project to proceed without requiring an impact statement, in a two-part
holding.30 First, the court held that MPCA appropriately applied the generic impact statement
because determinin whether this project would produce significant environmental effects is
"primarily factual,"I and "general principles of administrative law" require the court to defer to the
"technical expertise" of the agency. 2 Second, the Supreme Court ruled that the environmental
assessment constituted substantial evidence that the Boise project was subject to mitigation by
ongoing public regulatory authority because the Boise project was required to comply with all
MPCA standards and was dependent upon MPCA's issuance of permits. 3
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
On January 1, 1970, modem environmental policy and regulation came into being with the
signing into law of NEPA. 34 Several states emulated the federal government, enacting their own
environmental policy acts. Minnesota's act, unlike NEPA, contains provisions for the substantive
protection of the state's natural resources.3 However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a line of
negative declaration cases, has had difficulty applying the proper balance of procedural and
substantive review under MEPA. 36
A. NEPA and its progeny
The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that all federal agencies consider environmental factors
equally with other decision-making factors in the administrative process.37 NEPA is a procedural
statute and has no substantive component. 38 Consequently, when a judicial court reviews a federal
agency's consideration of environmental factors, the standard of review follows the federal
Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary or capricious" standard rather than a reasonableness or de
27 Id. at 237.
28 1d. at 2 3 8.
2 9 MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 462.
30 Id. at 465, 469
31 Id. at 464.
2 Id. at 465.
33 Id. at 466-67.
34 James W. Spensley, Esq., National Environmental Policy Act, in Environmental Lany Handbook, ch. 10,
413 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 15th ed., Government Institutes 1999); see infra pt. Ill.A.; see generally 42
U.S.C. § 4332 et seq. (2000).
35 Infra pt. III. B.
3 Infra pt. IllI.C.
" Spensley, supra n. 34, at ch.10, 413.
38 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) (Justice Rehnquist observed, "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.").
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novo standard. 39 This means that challenging an agency's decision in federal court is a daunting
task.40
Fifteen states have modeled their own "Little NEPA's" or "state environmental policy acts"
(SEPAs) after NEPA, 4 1 requiring state and local agencies to consider the environmental effects of
agency decisions.42 SEPAs are particularly important to state environmental law because they
provide citizens with the ability to challenge and enjoin projects when government agencies have
failed to adequately consider the environmental effects of their actions under the statute.43
B. MEPA and the Sustainable Forest Resources Act
The State of Minnesota, in 1973, enacted its own SEPA legislation in the form of MEPA."
The purposes of the statute were to declare a state environmental policy, to promote efforts that
prevent damage to the environment and contribute to the welfare of human beings, and to develop
the state's understanding of its environment and natural resources.45
Minnesota is unique in that it is one of few states to incor Torate both procedural and
substantive requirements into the environmental review process. One substantive requirement
states that.
[n]o state action significantly affecting the quality of the environment shall be
allowed, nor shall any permit for natural resources management and development be
granted, where such action or permit has caused or is likely to cause pollution,
impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state, so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with
the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and welfare and the state's
paramount concern for the protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources
from pollution, impairment, or destruction. Economic considerations alone shall not
justify such conduct.4 7
48This Subdivision applies to projects approved after the preparation of an impact statement. Thus, it
would not apply to a project that was determined not to have a potential for significant
environmental impact.
See William H Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, § 9.5, 873 (2d ed., West 1994).
See id. at § 9.3, 838 ("Twelve times the Court has taken NEPA cases and twelve times has decided in favor
of the government.").
David Sive & Mark A. Chertok, "Little NEPA 's" and their Environmental Impact Assessment Processes,
SGI01 ALl-ABA 1259, 1261 (2002).
42 Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. Manaster, State Environmental Law, § 10.01, 10-1,2, (7th ed., Clark
Boardman Callaghan 1996).
43id.
4 Minn. Stat. § 116D.01 etseq. (2001).
4 Minn. Stat. § 116D.01 (2001).
46 Sive & Chertok, supra n. 41, at 1262.
4 Minn. Stat. § I 16D.04, Subdiv. 6.
Stacy Lynn Bettison, The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act: The Minnesota Court ofAppeals and the Needfor Meaningful Judicial Review. 26 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 967, 987 n. 108 (2000)("This subsection is triggered only when an [impact statement] has already determined that there will be
significant impairment to the environment due to the proposed project").
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However, MEPA's declaration of state environmental policy has another substantive
requirement. 49 Section 116D.02 of MEPA states that,
The legislature, recognizing the profound impact of human activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high density urbanization, industrial expansion, resources
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare
and development of human beings, declares that it is the continuing policy of the state
government, in cooperation with federal and local governments, and other concerned public
and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which human beings and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of the state's people.50
Under MEPA, the primary procedural tools used to assess the environmental effects of
projects that require agency approval are the environmental assessment and the impact statement.:
An environmental assessment is "a brief document which is designed to set out the basic facts
necessary to determine whether an environmental impact statement is required for a proposed
action," 52 and must be prepared when there may be a potential for significant environmental effects
because of a proposed action.: An environmental impact statement is an "analytical... document
which describes the proposed action in detail, analyzes its significant environmental impacts,
discusses appropriate alternatives to the proposed action and their impacts, and explores methods by
which adverse environmental impacts of an action could be mitigated."54 An environmental impact
statement is prepared upon the determination that "there is potential for significant environmental
effects resulting from any major governmental action."55
MEPA authorizes Minnesota's Environmental Quality Board (EQB) to promulgate rules in
conformity with MEPA's directives. 56 The EQB rules require mandatory preparation of
environmental assessments if proposed projects satisfy a "threshold test" by meeting the criteria in
one of 35 categories of regulated environmental effects. 7 The same rules assign a particular state
agency, or responsible government unit (RGU), to prepare the environmental assessment. Under
the Minnesota Rules, when an RGU,
4 Id. at 999-1000 ("This language mirrors the language in NEPA that originally was deemed to contain the
substantive requirements." Id. at 1000 n. 181); see infra n. 141.
50 Minn. Stat. § I 16D.02, Subdiv. 1.
s See generally Minn. Stat. § 116D.04.
'2 Id. at Subdiv. I a(c).
s3 Id. at Subdiv. 2a(c).
54 Id. at Subdiv. 2a (Additionally, the EIS considers "economic, employment and sociological effects" of the
action's implementation, and the EIS shall "be prepared as early as practical.").
ss Id.; Minn. R. 4410.1700 (2001).
s6 Minn. Stat. § I 16D.04, Subdiv. 5a.
5See Minn. R. 4410.4300.
58 See id. (Subparagraph 15.A. designates MPCA as the RGU for projects that seeking to modify a "stationary
source facility that increases generation by 100 tons or more per year of any single air pollutant after
installation of air pollution control equipment," as applicable in the instant case).
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decid[es] whether a project has the potential for significant environmental effects, the
following factors shall be considered:
A. type, extent, and reversibility of environmental effects;
B. cumulative potential effects of related or anticipated future projects;
C. the extent to which the environmental effect are subject to mitigation by-ongoing
public regulatory authority; and
D. the extent to which environmental effects can be anticipated and controlled as a result
of other available environmental studies undertaken by public agencies or the project
proposer, including other EISs.59
If. after consideration of these factors, the RGU determines that the proposed project has no potential
for significant environmental effects, the RGU issues a negative declaration and an impact statement
is not required.
In addition to the environmental assessment and the environmental impact statement
mentioned above, the Minnesota Rules also sanction the use of a generic environmental impact
statement "to study types of projects that are not adequately reviewed on a case-by-case basis. A
generic impact statement may be ordered by EQB or may be requested by the public.62 While a
generic impact statement may not act as a substitute for project-specific environmental review, 63a
,,64generic impact statement may be incorporated into project-specific review by "tiering".
From 1989 to 1994, the EQB prepared a generic impact statement, considering the impact of
timber harvesting on Minnesota's forests, in response to a petition by concerned Minnesota
citizens.65 In 1995, based upon the results of the generic impact statement,6 6 the state legislature
enacted the Sustainable Forest Resources Act (SFRA).67
SFRA established the Minnesota Forest Resources Council (Resources Council), 68 and
requires the Resources Council to "develop recommendations to the governor... with respect to forest
resource policies and practices that result in the sustainable management, use, and protection of the'
state's forest resources." 69
Under the SFRA. the Resources Council is ordered to develop timber harvesting and forest
management guidelines. "The guidelines must address the water, air, soil, biotic, recreational, and
aesthetic resources found in forest ecosystems by focusing on those impacts commonly associated
with applying site-level forestry practices [and].. .must reflect a range of practical and sound
5 Minn. R. 4410.1700. Subp. 7 (2001).
60 See id. at Subp. 3.
61 Minn. R. 4410.3800. Subp. 1.
62 Id. at S Ubps. 2, 3.
63 Id. at Subp. 8.
64Id.: see generally Spensley, National Environmental Policy Act, in Environmental Law Handbook, ch. 10,
426 ("Tiering is an approach whereby the very site-specific project EIS can incorporate by reference and
without repetition the broader considerations of a region-wide EIS.. .if they are relevant.").65 MCEA., 644 N.W.2d at 463.
66 Id.
67 Minn. Stat. § 89A.0I et seq. (2001).
68 Minn. Stat. § 89A.03.
69 Id. at Subdiv. 2 (emphasis added).7o Minn. Stat. § 89A.05.
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practices based on the best available scientific information."7 1 These guidelines, however, are
voluntary.7 2
C. Minnesota Case Law and Scope ofJudicial Review
Minnesota case law has produced inconsistent results and approaches to judicial review of an
agency's issuance of a negative declaration. In Trout Unlimitedlnc. v. Minn. Dept. ofAgric., 7 5
concerned Minnesota citizens petitioned for environmental review of a proposed irrigation project.
After the preparation of an environmental assessment that identified potential significant erosion that
might not be mitigable, 76 the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture concluded that
"[m]onitoring and permit conditions" were sufficient ongoing public regulatory authority.n The
court reversed the Commissioner's negative declaration, reasoning that
[u]nder the Commissioner's analysis, the irrigation project would go forward without
an [impact statement] and in the event significant environmental effects did occur. the
Commissioner would then rely on monitoring or restrictive permitting procedures to
reduce or eliminate those deleterious effects. The very purpose of an [impact
statement], however is to determine the potential for significant environmental effects
before they occur. By deferring this issue to later permitting and monitoring
decisions, the Commissioner abandoned his duty to require an [impact statement]
where there exists a "potential for significant environmental effects." 78
Subsequently, the court held that the environmental assessment revealed a potential for significant
environmental effects of the project and ordered the preparation of an environmental impact
statement.79
Two months later, in Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resources,8 0
another panel of the court of appeals upheld an RGUs negative declaration, yet still required the
project proposers to complete four environmental studies before the RGU would issue a conditional
use permit. 2 The plaintiffs' argument that an impact statement would differ from the four studies in
comprehensiveness of review and the proposal of alternatives was not well taken by the court.83
which held that the RGU's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial
n1 Id. at Subdiv. 1.
72 Id. at Subdiv. 3; (It is the voluntary nature of the Resources Council's timber management guidelines that is
at the heart of the dispute in the instant case. See MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 463.).
1 See Selmi & Manaster, State Environmental Law, § 10.03, 10-18, 19.
7 528 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App. 1995).
1 Id. at 905 ("Because of the steep slopes and coarse soil along the stream, a concern arose that the proposed
irrigation could erode the stream banks, resulting is significant degradation.").
76 Id. at 905-6.
n See id. at 909.
78 Id.
79 id
8 531 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. App. 1995).
81 Id. at 877-8 (determining that no environmental impact statement was required for a project that proposed
to construct a golf course and possibly 200-250 housing units).
8 2 Id.
8 See id. at 884.
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84evidence in the record. Furthermore, the Iron Rangers Court found that the case before them was
distinguishable from Trout. There, "it was impossible to determine the likely impact of herbicides,
insecticides, and fungicides on a nearby stream without knowing the amount of the expected
chemical input" and thus, the Commissioner deferred his duty to make a determination until future
permitting decisions. This was not so in Iron Rangers. The court held the record to show that the
RGU properly relied on a conditional use permit process to determine the need for an impact
statement because the project proposer agreed to seek the permit before the review process began.
Additionally, "the county determined that it lacked sufficient information to issue a conditional use
permit for the golf course, and delayed its decision until it received the additional information
on.. .forest fragmentation."8 7
In National Audubon Society v. MPCA, the Potlatch Corporation proposed a plant
expansion, similar to the Boise project, that would increase the plant's wood consumption from
178,000 to 355,000 cords of wood per year. 89 MPCA prepared a mandatory environmental
assessment "based on the findings contained in the [generic impact statement]," 90 finding that the
expansion had no potential significant environmental effect. 91 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
applied the arbitrary or capricious standard when focusing "on the legal sufficiency of and factual
basis for the reasons given" by the agency, and employed the substantial evidence test when
reviewing the administrative record. 2 Holding that "MPCA's reliance on the specific mitigation
measures set forth in the [generic impact statement] to reduce the environmental impacts of the
Potlatch expansion was not unreasonable or impermissible," 93 the court of appeals reasoned that "it
is questionable whether a project-specific [impact statement] would provide information
substantially different from or better than that contained in the [generic impact statement]." 94
Trout, Iron Rangers and National Audubon have been criticized for failing to employ
procedural review of negative declarations, 95 conducting judicial review under the substantive
"unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious" standard.96 Specifically, Iron Rangers and National
Audubon have "unduly deferred when considering whether agency action is based upon unlawful
procedure. 97 In other words, these courts imposed their own substantive jud ments on agency
decisions, abdicating their function of providing meaningful judicial review.9 Upon this backdrop,
the MCEA Court addressed the standard of judicial review of an agency's issuance of a negative
declaration.
84 Id. at 885.
5 Id. at 885.
86 Id. at 884.
87 Id.
569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. App. 1997).
89 Id. at 214.
90 Id.
91 d.
9 2 Id. at 2 15.
9 Id. at 2 18.
94 Id. at 217.
9 See Bettison, supra n. 48, at 985-96.
96 Id. at 1007. n. 79.
9 Id. at 985.
98 See id. (Bettison argues, first and foremost, that the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt MAPA as the
appropriate standard of review for negative declarations. See id. at 971.).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the MPCA's decision not to
require an impact statement to analyze the environmental effects of Boise's efficiency improvement
project was supported by "substantial evidence" and was not "arbitrary or capricious." 99 In reaching
this conclusion, the court first considered whether the standard of review under the Minnesota
Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) should apply to the court's consideration of the MPCA's
decision, or whether the court should review the MPCA's decision de novo.100 After determining
that the MAPA standard of review was appropriate, the court considered the propriety of the
MPCA's use of the generic impact statement and whether, under Minnesota law and regulation., the
MPCA adequately determined that potential environmental effects of the Boise project were subject
to mitigation by continued regulation.10'
A. Standard of Review under the MAPA
The MAPA codifies the standard of judicial review when a court considers an agency
decision. 102 -The reviewing court may reverse the agency's decision if the decision may have
prejudiced the rights of the petitioners because the decision was an error of law. was unsupported by
substantial evidence, or was arbitrary or capricious.'03
In the instant case, the court explained that MPCA's decision regarding the Boise project was
not a "contested case" within the meaning of the MAPA.10 4 Nevertheless, in determining that the
MAPA's standards of review should apply, the court relied on principles of administrative law set
forth in Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst.' Under the principle of separation of powers, the legislature
may not delegate to the court "duties which are essentially administrative in character."' This
principle underlies the rule that "decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of
correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies' expertise and their special
knowledge in the field of their technical training, education and experience." 07
MCEA, on the other hand, argued that the court should show no deference to MPCA.s08
Although an agency is entitled to deference in interpreting its own rules, MPCA engaged in
99 MCEA. 644 N.W.2d at 469.
100 Id. at 463-64 (MCEA argued in favor of de novo review); see generally Minn. Stat. § 14 (2001).
10 See id. at 465-69.
02 See Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2001).
13 Id. (..[the court] may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have
been prejudiced because of the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are: (a) In violation
of constitutional provisions or (b) In excess of the statutory authority orjurisdiction of the agency; or (c)
Made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) Affected by other error of law; or (e) Unsupported by substantial
evidence in view of the entire record submitted: or (f) Arbitrary or capricious").
MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 464. n. 8 ("Here, MPCA's decision not to require an [impact Statement] was not a
contested case within the meaning of the MAPA because no hearing was required and the only 'party'
involved in the original decision was Boise Cascade;" see Minn. Stat. § 14.02, subdiv. 3 (2000) ("'Contested
case' means a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties
are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.").
0 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
1W MCEA. 644 N.W.2d at 464 (citing Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824).
i Id. at 463.
18 Id. at 464.
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environmental review under MEPA interpreting the rules of another agency, the EQB.' 09 Thus,
since MPCA was not interpreting its own rules, the court's review necessarily presented legal issues
that must be considered de novo.1 10
Nevertheless, employing Reserve Mining, the MCEA Court determined that environmental
review was sufficiently technical to require the MPCA's expertise and deferred to the agency's
interpretation of the statute and its determination that the statutory requirements were met."' In so
deciding the court reasoned that "[a] determination whether significant environmental effects result
from this project is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agency's technical
knowledge and expertise to the facts presented."l 2 Thus, the instant case would be decided in
accordance with the MAPA by considering whether there was substantial evidentiary support
underlying MPCA's decision not to require an impact statement, or whether the decision was
arbitrary or capricious. 3
B. Application of the Substantial Evidence Standard
After establishing the standard of review, the court considered the MCEA's argument that the
MPCA failed to conduct the necessary analysis to justify reliance on the generic impact statement. 114
Stating that its role in reviewing the MPCA's decision was limited," 5 the court emphasized the
significance of the EQB's approval of the use of the generic impact statement. 116
Also significant was MPCA's lengthy consultation with MDNR, an agency with technical
expertise in timber and forestry. "7 Because of MDNR's technical expertise, MPCA properly relied
on MDNR's conclusion that the generic impact statement was the most "comprehensive, scientific
assessment of forest health procedures to date," and that the Boise Project was of the type
anticipated by the generic impact statement.
Therefore, the court deferred to the MPCA's use of the generic impact statement in the
preparation of the environmental assessment, holding that such use was not arbitrary or capricious
because of the agencies' (MPCA and MDNR) technical expertise in assessing environmental
issues. 1 9
Next, the court considered whether the environmental effects of the Boise Project were
subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority.120 MPCA, in its findings of fact and
conclusions, found that the Boise Project was subject to mitigation under the SFRA and the
corresponding guidelines established by MFRC.' ' MCEA had argued, and the court of appeals
109 Br. of Respt. at 19, MCEA, supra n. 1.
1o Id.
See id. at 464.
"Id. at 463.
MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 464.
'4 Id.
Id. at 465, (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519,
555 (1978).
6 Id.; see generally Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, (Minn. Environmental Quality Bd.,
Dec. 20, 1999).
'' Id. at 465.
1' Id.
19 Id
'20 See generally id. at 465-69.
12'Id. at 465.
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agreedI 22 that the voluntary timber management guidelines promulgated by the MFRC were not
"subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority," 123 as required under Minnesota's
Administrative Rules, because the MFRC had no power to enforce its guidelines.' 24
As noted above,125 the proper test to resolve the issue was embodied in the "substantial
evidence standard" under MAPA. After considering the record, Boise's project design, and the
permitting function of MPCA, the court found "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support [MPCA's] conclusion."1 26
First, "the 36-page Appendix E of the [environmental assessment] detailed an array of
specific mitigation measures being undertaken." 27 Second, the record, as established by the
environmental assessment, showed commitments by Boise and MDNR to apply the Forest Council's
guidelines to land that they own, while the MDNR and United States Forest Service (Forest Service)
are actively implementing mitigation measures in one-third of the forested land in Minnesota.128
Finally, MPCA's findings showed that Boise made "detailed" commitments to mitigation. 29
Next, the court agreed with MPCA's conclusion that any potential significant environmental
effects of the Boise Project had been identified and that the proper mitigation measures were
incorporated into the project design.130 Citing Appendix F of the environmental assessment, the
court agreed with MPCA that Boise's 24 mitigation efforts, MDNR's commitment to the timber
management guidelines, and county and federal efforts on their land all constituted real
commitments to mitigation beyond the voluntary nature of the guidelines.' 3 ' "Thus, it is irrelevant
whether the MFRC is a public regulatory authority because the MPCA can, if necessary, enforce
mitigative measures through its permitting function."
The court also agreed with MPCA's finding that mitigation was incorporated into proposed
permits. 33 The Boise Project required two permit modifications by MPCA that included mitigation
12 See MCEA, 632 N.W.2d at 237-38.
12 Minn. R. 4410.1700, Subpara. 7(C) (2001).
124 MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 466-67, (The MCEA also argued that the MFRC was not a "public regulatory
authority" under 44410.1700, but the court dismissed the Court dismissed this argument because the MPCA
could compel mitigation through its permitting function.).
Supra pt. IV.A.126 MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 466-67 (citing Cable Conununications Bd. V Nor-West Cable Communications
Partnership, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984) (The court defined substantial evidence as "(1) such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion: (2) more than a scintilla of
evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its
entirety").
21 Id. at 466; see generally MCEA v. MPCA, Appendix for Respondent Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy, C6-01-96 R- 142-81.
12s id.
129 Id. (The court also emphasized commitments to mitigation efforts by MDNR's, several Minnesota
counties', and federal efforts on their respective lands); see generally MCEA, supra n. 1, Appendix for
Respondent Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, C6-01-96 R-182-84.
0 id.
132 Id. at 467.
133 1
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measures within the scope of each permit.134 Finding that the permit requirements created at least
some mandatory aspect of mitigation, the court also found that these permit requirements, in addition
to other voluntary and ongoing mitigation measures, established ongoing public regulation of the
Boise Project.13 5
Finally, after addressing the issue of ongoing public regulatory authority, the MCEA Court
clarified its review of the MPCA's decision in light of MCEA's and the appellate court's criticism of
the voluntary nature of the mitigation measures. It was "somewhat misleading," said the court, to
focus on the mandatory or voluntary nature of the mitigation measures. 136 The court's review
focused on the adequacy and factual foundation of the MPCA's decision that the Boise Project had
no potential for significant environmental effects, and thus, required no impact statement.137 Still,
the court reinforced its decision stating that the Minnesota Rules fail to address whether mitigation
measures are mandatory or voluntary. 38 Under MEPA, however, mitigation factors must be
voluntary.
Therefore, the court held that "the MPCA's conclusion that 'the potential environmental
effects of the project [were] subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority' was
supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious," 40 because the mitigation
measures were incorporated into Boise's project design, and were subject to regulation through
MPCA's mandatory re-issuance of regulatory permits.141
V. COMMENT
Stacy Lynn Bettison's article examined the instances in which the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has abdicated its judicial function in determining when agencies have properly complied
with MEPA's procedures, She attacked the National Audubon decision for its failure to conduct a
""distinct procedural review.' 143 Additionally, she castigated the court's imposition of its judgment
over MEPA's procedural requirements, which bar the use of generic impact analysis in lieu of
EQB's requirements for project-specific review.144
Id. (Under the Clean Air Act., MPCA administers and enforces Title V air operating permits and
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permits. MPCA required Boise to obtain both of these permits before





Id.: see Minn. Stat. § 89A.05, Subd. 3 ("The timber harvesting and forest management guidelines are
voluntarv.").
o Id at 469.
Id. at 466-67.
Bettison, supra n. 48, at 972.
13 Id. (Although Bettison concentrates on the importance of procedural review, she notes that "[MEPA]
might require certain substantive results, such as requiring agencies to avoid the detrimental environmental
impacts addressed in the [impact statement] or [environmental assessment]. Id. at 977, n. 46.)
See Id. at 1003-06 ("In sanctioning the use of a GEIS to determine a project's potential for significant
environmental effect, the Audubon court undermined the force of MEPA, gutted the regulations prohibiting
the use of the GEIS as a substitute for project-specific review, and weakened the GEIS as a viable method for
developing long-term environmental policies, strategies and goals." Id. at 1006).
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Bettison saw MCEA, then undecided, as "Audubon II, "145 and must have hoped that the
Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt her proposed method of review. Although MCEA conducted
a "distinctly procedural review," the case was similar to National Audubon not in reasoning, but in
result - abdication of meaninftul procedural or substantive judicial review. After deciding that
MAPA review would apply,' 6 the MCEA Court deferred to EQB in determining that the use of the
generic impact statement was appropriate in the preparation of the environmental assessment. 147 As
discussed earlier, National Audubon affirmed a negative declaration based on a generic impact
statement because it was "questionable" whether an impact statement would result in information
beyond that already found in the generic impact statement.148
Surprisingly, in the instant case, we have seen a distinct procedural review produce the same
unfortunate outcome under strikingly similar factual circumstances. In order to effectuate the
procedural and substantive requirements of MEPA, Minnesota's courts must approach every
negative declaration case with an eye toward procedural and substantive agency review, and must
establish a rational framework for such review.
A. Procedural and Substantive Review under MAPA
Because MEPA is not merely a procedural statute, Minnesota's courts may review both the
agency's adherence to procedure and its substantive decisions.149 Therefore, procedural judicial
review considers whether an agency decision was "made upon unlawful procedure," while
substantive judicial review considers whether an agency decision was arbitrary and capricious.' 50
Bettison suggests that "when determining whether the agency has followed proper procedure, a
substantive evaluation will, at times, become necessary."' 51
For instance, the EQB's MEPA regulations provide that the RGU shall consider the
"cumulative potential effects of related or anticipated future projects" when
determining whether the proposed project has the potential for significant
environmental effects. The EQB has interpreted this criterion to mean "that
cumulative impacts must be weighed along with the project's direct impacts." In
considering whether the agency followed this procedural requirement, the court must
first ask whether the RGU considered cumulative impacts. If the [environmental
assessment] entirely omitted a discussion of cumulative impacts or if the RGU's
consideration was "pro forma," then the RGU failed to follow the regulation requiring
analysis of cumulative impacts. If, on the other hand, the [environmental assessment]
discussed cumulative impacts to a certain extent, then the court must look to the
actual content of the cumulative impact analysis to determine its validity. At this
point the inquiry becomes substantive. While the overarching issue is whether the
agency followed procedure, the question has transformed into a substantive review,
4 1 Id. at 1005, n. 219.
146 MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 464.
141 Supra pt. IV.B-
148 Bettison, supra n. 48, at 1003.




MELPR, Vol. 10, No. 2
and, as noted above, the court should defer to the technical expertise of the agency,
reviewing only for arbitrariness or caprice.152
This subject matter of the example above was addressed by the court of appeals in MCEA.
The environmental assessment addressed cumulative impacts, requiring the court to look at the
actual content of the analysis. The court of appeals quoted the environmental assessment, stating,
[t]he precise effects of cumulative timber harvest, at current and projected levels. .
.within the area where Boise Cascade procures wood is not scientifically known.
Research beyond the scope of this [environmental assessment] is required to address
this potential type of impact and apply the results in developing appropriate
mitigation strategies. 153
Following Bettison's "procedure first, substance second" review, it is clear that the agency's
negative declaration was arbitrary and capricious on the basis of its cumulative impact analysis.
However, the district court ruled that it did not need to address this issue because MCEA did not
timely appeal the EQB's determination of adequacy.' 54 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
avoided the cumulative impact analysis, stating that mitigation was the only relevant issue on
appeal.
If the State of Minnesota is as serious about protecting its natural resources as MEPA's
substantive requirements would suggest,156 reviewing courts must have the authority to raise issues
of agency caprice anew. However, such review should not open the door to unlimited substantive
review of agency findings. Thus, Minnesota must find a way to balance substantive and procedural
review with MEPA's substantive and procedural requirements. Otherwise, as in the instant case,
MEPA will have been relegated to a procedural statute and the legislature can dispense of
substantive MEPA.
Minnesota's courts can resolve this problem by adding one step before engaging in
Bettison's procedure first review. This step involves distinguishing questions of law from questions
of fact.
B. The Law-Fact Distinction
One of the more challenging tasks of a court deciding whether there is a need for an impact
statement is distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact. 157 A court must decide all
15 2 Id. at 1000-01.
15 MCEA, 632 N.W.2d at 236.
MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 461 (Though the district court went on to find that MPCA properly used the generic
impact statement, it did not incorporate a substantive review of the environmental assessment as suggested by
Bettison).
Id. at 465.
56 See supra n. 50 (Minn. Stat. § I 16D.02).
57Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law, and Litigation, § 8.02[3], 8-11 (2nd ed., West 1998) ("Distinguishing
between legal and factual questions in NEPA threshold decisions is difficult because the findings necessary to
determine questions of law, such as the meaning of 'significance,' are often findings of fact usually left
largely to agency discretion.").
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questions of law, while an agency should be granted deference to its factual determinations.' 5 The
law-fact distinction is of prime importance in the administrative review process because it serves as
a guideline for the division of labor between judge and administrator based on their respective
expertise.' 5 9
Daniel Mandelker, analyzing the law-fact distinction to judicial review of negative
declarations, states that a court "must first give a legal interpretation to the word 'significant' and
must then apply that definition to the agency's action."' 60 The MCEA Court should have followed
this approach by defining "significant" as a matter of law within the context of MEPA and the EQB
Rules. Instead, the court simply decided that "significant" environmental effects were mere
questions of fact. 16 1
MEPA requires the preparation of an impact statement "[w]here there is potential for
significant environmental effects. . . ."162 Neither "significant" nor "significant environmental
effects" are expressly defined under MEPA or the EQB Rules. Nevertheless, MEPA provides a
framework for a legal definition of "significant" in addition to the four factors to be considered
under the EQB Rules. This framework is located within MEPA's substantive requirements.
Mandelker suggests that a statute creates substantive requirements if it contains "law to
apply" as found in its declaration of environmental policy.' 63 MEPA expressly contains a
declaration of environmental policy in § 116D.02, Subdivision One,164 which states,
it is the continuing policy of the state government, in cooperation with federal and
local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all
practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which human beings and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements ofpresent and future
generations of the state's people.' 65
The next question is whether this subdivision contains "law to apply." 6 6 By requiring the use of "all
practicable means. . .in a matter calculated. . .to promote the general welfare," the policy clearly
proscribes what the state government must do, and how it must do it. Thus, on its face MEPA's
policy statement does contain "law to apply." 6 7
158 See Id.
159 Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law, § 10.5, 634 (3d ed., Little, Brown & Company 1991).
160 Mandelker, supra n. 157, at § 8.02[3], p. 8-9, 10.
161 See MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 464 ("'A determination whether significant environmental effects result from
this project is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agency's technical knowledge and
expertise to the facts presented.").
162 Minn. Stat. § I 16D.04, Subd. 2a.
163 Mandelker, supra n. 1 57, at § 10.04[ 1], p. 10-19; see generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
'
64 See Minn. Stat. § 1 16D.04, Subd. I (Full text of Subdivision 1).
165 Minn. Stat. § 1 16D.02, Subd. I (emphasis added).
166 See Id. at § 10.04[1], p. 10-19 ("One example of a statutory policy thatmay contain substantive 'law to
apply' is the policy that 'it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to . . . attain the widest
range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation.").
161 If nothing more, this policy statement at least deserves the attention and interpretation of Minnesota's
highest court.
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How then should Minnesota's courts apply the substantive law found within MEPA? The
use of "all practicable means and measures" calculated to achieve MEPA's substantive requirements
appears to create a sort of substantive-procedural requirement. On the procedural side, it tells the
agency what it must do, but substantively requires more than pro forma compliance. This is
evidenced by the use of the word practicable, which denotes possibility, not functionality.16 8 As
used in the statute, "practicable means and measures" would require environmental assessments and
impact statements to use up-to-date statistical data, particularly in situations where it is unclear that
an agency's decision will, in fact, meet MEPA's substantive requirements. Furthermore, an agency
must proceed "in a matter calculated to foster and promote" everything from the general welfare to
the "future generations of the state's people." This language is substantive, because it tells the
agency how it must make its determinations.
MEPA's policy statement contains a definition of what forms of potential environmental
effects the state legislature considered significant and desired to protect. Thus, contrary to the
court's reliance on Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens' Council,16 9 MEPA's substantive provisions
cannot be ignored,170 and create requirements in addition to the four considerations under the EQB
rules. The court failed to address MEPA's substantive provisions and, with rubber-stamp in hand,
failed to provide meaningful judicial review of MPCA's findings.,7 '
C. Applying "Significance" to MPCA's Consideration ofMitigation
Following Mandelker's direction, the next step is to apply the legal definition of significance
to the agency's findings.172 In considering whether MPCA's finding that the Boise Project was
subject to mitigation measures included all practicable means and measures calculated to foster and
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which human beings and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and to fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of the state's people, the court must first ask whether MPCA
considered mitigation.m Because MPCA did address mitigation in the environmental assessment,
MPCA did follow the regulation requiring analysis of mitigation. 174 Since the environmental
assessment discussed mitigation to a certain extent, then the court must look to the actual content of
the mitigation analysis to determine its validity. At this point the inquiry becomes substantive and
The Oxford Essential Dictionary, 468 (American Edition, Berkley Books 1998) (Practical and practicable
are sometimes confused. Practical means 'concerning practice,' that is, 'useful; functional.' Practicable
comes from practice able, meaning 'able to be practiced' or 'able to be done; possible.').
1 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989) (NEPA does not require specific results or substantive requirements that
mitigation plans be actually formulated or adopted).
o MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 468 n. 10 ("We note that the question whether the MEPA contains substantive
protections above and beyond the procedural protections it shares with federal law is not before this court, and
we will not address that issue here.").
While this standard of review is required under NEPA, Minnesota courts are not strictly limited to
procedural review. See supra pt. Ill.A, B.
172 Supra n. 156.
1See Bettison, supra n. 48 (The language from Bettison's example concerning cumulative impact analysishas been modified to incorporate MPCA's consideration of mitigation and "significant" as defined under
MEPA.).
See supra n. 59 (Minn. R. 4410.1700.).
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the court should defer to the technical expertise of the agency, reviewing only for arbitrariness or
caprice.
Now, with a legal definition of "significant," MPCA is held to the arbitrary and capricious
standard with regard to its technical consideration of mitigation and its consideration of significance
as a matter of law. Admittedly the definition of significant was not articulated at the time of
MPCA's decision. Nevertheless the substantive requirement existed and must have been considered
in accordance with MEPA.
Thus, under the revised standard of review, Justice Paul H. Anderson's observations in his
concurring opinion support the view that MPCA's consideration of mitigation was arbitrary and
capricious. He specifically observed that "the record reflects that neither the MPCA nor the DNR
analyzed the potential environmental effects of Boise Cascade's project under the assumption that
mitigation measures for timber harvesting, such as the MFRC timber harvesting guidelines, would
be included in any MPCA permits." 176 Additionally,
[t]o support its holding, the majority also relie[d] upon the mitigation measures
implemented and enforced by the United States Forest Service (USFS), the DNR, and
certain Minnesota counties. However, the MPCA did not address these measures as
part of its specific findings on mitigation and presumably did not base its final
decision on them. 7 7
Though Justice Anderson relented that there was, nevertheless, a scintilla of evidence in the record
to support MPCA's conclusion, 17 under the revised standard the record indicates that MPCA failed
to incorporate the mitigation of timber harvesting into its permits, and thus, could not have included
all practicable means and measures in a manner calculated to protect Minnesota's natural resources.
Employing this analysis, the court should have found MPCA's evaluation of mitigation arbitrary and
capricious, and should have required the preparation of an impact statement in order to fulfill
MEPA's commitment to maintain harmony between human beings and nature, and to fulfill the
social or long-term economic requirements of the state's people.
D. Impact Statement Preparation
As a final note, one observation on the decision to prepare or to forego impact statements is
that businesses and agencies both have interests in avoiding impact statements because of the time
and financial costs of preparation.179 As one commentator put it, "[s]tatistically, [impact statement]
7 See supra n. 175.
71 See MCEA, 644 N.W.2d at 469 (emphasis in original).
177 Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 470 (Although these mitigation measures are certainly not as comprehensive as those recommended
in the Forestry GEIS, the mitigation measures noted by the majority do constitute more than a scintilla of
evidence in the record that the MPCA did, in fact, consider the extent to which the effects of the project were
subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority." (emphasis added)).
Selmi, supra n. 42, at 10-16 ("Because of the cost and delay associated with preparation of a full EIS,
private applicants often would prefer to avoid preparing an impact statement if they can change their project
to reduce possibly significant environmental effects to a level of insignificance. Thus, the practice of issuing
"conditional" or "mitigated" negative declarations has become increasingly common.").
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preparation is the exception rather than the rule."' 80 In 1996, Minnesota RGUs prepared 137
environmental assessments and two impact statements.
In pursuing the Boise project and defending the adequacy of MPCA's record, Boise cites a
three-and-a-half year preparation process, the preparation of the approximately 150-page
environmental assessment, and another year-long process of public and agency review and
comment. 182 Additionally, Boise asserted that the MPCA record consisted of over 600 documents,
comprising of over 6,000 pages of materials.' 83
Upon these facts, it appears that MPCA's environmental assessment amounts to substantially
more than "a brief document which is designed to set out the basic facts necessary to determine
whether an environmental impact statement is required." 84 Selmi, in his treatise on state
environmental law, recognized that "where the agency finds itself preparing voluminous documents
to support such a declaration - documents that approach the length of an [impact statement] - the
agency might be better advised to complete the full [impact statement] process rather than risk
having a conditional negative declaration overturned."'
Intuitively, the environmental assessment exists to accelerate the environmental review
process for projects with minimal environmental impact, thus saving an agency's limited resources
of time and money. However, given the legislature's purpose for enacting MEPA,186 the Resources
Council's directive to "foster no net loss of forest land in Minnesota", and the "brief document"
characterization of the environmental assessment, 188 an impact statement would have been the most
appropriate, indeed the necessary analysis, to ensure the continued sustainable development of.
Minnesota's forests. Despite the fact that the court held in MPCA's favor, the instant litigation and
collateral costs may have been entirely avoided by the thoroughness and greater perception of
legitimacy of an impact statement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In iCEA, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed MPCA's negative declaration using only
procedural standards of judicial review. The court should have expanded its review to include
MEPA's substantive requirements by engaging in substantive review of the word "significant".189
By failing to address the legal definition of "significant," the court ignored MEPA's substantive
" Bettison, supra n. 48. at 975.
Id. ("The Minnesota Historical Society informally records the number of EAWs and EISs prepared each
year. While that office is missing some data, its information also reveals few EISs preared yearly: in 1997, 60
-EAWs and zero ElSs: in 1998, 99 EAWs and one EIS; and in 1999, 68 EAWs and one EIS....On the other
hand, an individual from the Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Review Section, suggested
different numbers, although his data could not be confirmed: 150 - 200 EAWs each year compared to 5 - 10
ElSs each year." Id. at 975, n. 34).
18 MCEA. Br. of Intervenor-Petitioner Boise Cascade, at 9.
11 Id. at 10.
84 Supra at n. 52.
18i Selmi, supra n. 42, at. 10-19.
86 Supra at n. 50.
187 Minn. Stat. § 89.02, Subd. 2(5).
1 Supra at n. 52.
9 See infra pt. V.C.
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provisions and has threatened the very component of MEPA that makes it more than a mere carbon
copy of NEPA.19 0
In the aftermath of MCEA, Minnesota's courts and legislature, as well as all states that have
or are desirous of substantive environmental protections, must find a way to rationally balance
procedural and substantive review in environmental cases. Only then can substantive SEPAs
effectuate their legislative mandate to substantively protect states' environments from arbitrary
agency decisions.
THOMAS SCHMID
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